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1 Introduction
The search for ways to eradicate poverty has occu-
pied the minds and efforts of policymakers and
practitioners in developed and developing coun-
tries for decades. During this time, different ideolo-
gies have shaped the design of strategies and
policies to deal with this problem, yet the number
of poor people in the world continues to increase.
In the late 1970s, neo-liberalism became the dom-
inant ideology guiding economic and social policy
design in developed countries. Since then, interna-
tional conventional wisdom on anti-poverty policy
has been shaped by the overarching influence of
neo-liberal principles, which has influenced policy-
making throughout the developing world and pro-
vided continuity over the past two decades.
However, the strategies endorsed by conventional
wisdom have also experienced important changes
during this time, which reflect its ability to respond
to critiques and evidence of its limitations. Three
broad phases can be identified: the support for a
radical roll-back of the state from economic and
social policy; the endorsement of compensatory
programmes for poverty alleviation; and the pro-
posal of the New Poverty Agenda (NPA) (see Toye,
in this Bulletin), During the 1990s, the NPA
emerged as the new conventional wisdom and its
strategy has underpinned the design of many anti-
poverty programmes.
The focus of this article is to show how the con-
ventional wisdom is transferred into the design of
national anti-poverty policies and programmes
within specific country settings. For this purpose,
the Mexican governments anti-poverty policy since
1982 will be analysed. Mexico makes an interesting
case study because: the government has been
implementing anti-poverty programmes since the
The information contained in this paper is the product
of research conducted from January to September 1998.
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early 1970s (longer than many other developing
countries); the federal government's anti-poverty
policy since the 1980s has shared strong parallels
with the three phases described above, culminating
in the introduction of the NPA as a basis for strategy
design, which is best represented by PROGRESA,
the current governmenls key anti-poverty pro-
gramme; and it also presents unique features. The
Mexican case calls attention to the distinct national
historical, economic, political and social factors that
come into play as the strategies designed by inter-
national policymakers are put into practice in
developing countries. It shows that the conven-
tional wisdom should not be seen as a model which
is always imposed on developing country govern-
ments, as is often assumed, and that it will certainly
take different shapes under different settings. This
analysis will serve as an example of how NPA-based
programmes are put in practice, what factors influ-
ence their country-specific design, and their poten-
tial and limitations for alleviating and reducing
poverty
2 The Introduction of Neo-
Liberalism in Mexico: A Partial
Retreat of the State (1982-88)
In 1982, the administration of President de la
Madrid inherited a country sunk deep in economic
crisis. The large fiscal deficit and increasing debt
service, coupled with the unavailability of foreign
lending or other sources of financing, left Mexico
facing a balance of payments crisis with 'far-reach-
ing consequences' (Friedman et aI. 1995). As had
been the case with developed countries and other
developing countries confronting economic down-
fall, the government acknowledged the need to
restructure the economy It contracted policy-based
loans with the IMF and the World Bank and started
implementing stabilisation policies (initially) and
adjustment policies (since the mid-1980s).
The de la Madrid administration put in practice a
harsh orthodox reform package focused on demand
restraint and a retreat of the state from its previously
active economic role, including such measures as:
the reduction of public expenditure, price liberali-
sation, restriction of credit, privatisation of state
Z These two programmes were not very successful in
terms of their impact on poverty, but are relevant as
predecessors of the anti-poverty efforts which followed.
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enterprises, trade and financial liberalisation, deval-
uation and wage reduction (see Lustig 1992).
Although this overhaul of the economy took place
within the context of borrowing from the IMF and
World Bank, it cannot be seen as an imposed pack-
age. The crisis coincided with the start of an admin-
istration led by the first in the line of technocratic
presidents that have governed Mexico until today
This meant that the perception of the need to
implement orthodox economic policies was shared
by Mexico's new technocratic elite.
The change to a neo-liberal economic model had
implications for social policy in Mexico. The goy-
ernmenls social policy since the 1940s had been
characterised by an incremental provision of social
services to the population, though guided to a great
extent by corporatist and clientelist patterns which
privileged some sectors of the population (e.g.
urban workers). Furthermore, in the 1970s two
anti-poverty programmes (PIDER and COPLAMAR)
were created to benefit the population (mostly
rural) that had been left out from the general social
policy2
The reduction of public investment from 10.8% of
GDP in 1982 to 4.9% in 1989 was the initial factor
leading to a drastic change of the social policy
model. There was a 6.2% annual contraction in
social expenditure from 1983 to 1988. The educa-
tion and health sectors were disproportionately hit,
suffering reductions of 30% and 23% respectively
while GDP per capita fell by 15% from 1982-88.
Initiatives directed at the poor were especially hard
hit, such as basic education and health programmes
within COPLAMAR and other rural and regional
development programmes. Most consumer and
producer subsidies were eliminated and expendi-
tures on general food subsidies fell from 1.25% of
GDP in 1983 to 0.37% in 1988. Universal subsidies
were substituted by targeted ones in order to main-
tain coherence with the new fiscal situation and the
ideological approach guiding the economic model
(Friedman et aI. 1995).
Therefore, both general social policy and interven-
tions directed specifically to the poor suffered dur-
ing this period. The new economic model was
translated into a decreased government capacity or
will to provide for the welfare needs of its citizens,
and the result was higher levels of poverty and
inequality According to official figures, the poverty
growth rate for 1981-87 was 29% with 51% of the
population (41 million) below the poverty line in
1987 and 21% below the extreme poverty line
(Trejo et al. 1993: 84, 86). Meanwhile inequality
increased from a Gini coefficient of 0.429 in 1984
to 0.469 in 1989 (PEF 1997: 16).
The overarching policy aims of this administration
were macro-economic stability and growth. This
was achieved by a roll-back from previous eco-
nomic interventionism together with excessive and
regressive cuts in social expenditure. In fact, eco-
nomic stabilisation was achieved and the economy
began to grow by the end of the administration. But
the social costs were already having political conse-
quences by fuelling dissent in the run-up to the
controversial 1988 presidential elections.
3 Programa Nacional de
Solidaridad (PRONASOL): Mexico's
Compensatory Anti-Poverty
Programme (1988-94)
In 1988, President Salinas inherited a country sub-
merged in one of its deepest legitimacy crises but
with the benefit of a stable economy, growing at
2.2% annually from 1988-94. Like his predeces-
sor, Salinas was a member of the new technocratic
elite and a strong supporter of the neo-liberal
agenda. At the same time he also had links with
some 'leftist' groups within the country. This was to
have powerful influence in the design of his anti-
poverty policy
The economic policy of the Salinas administration
was purely neo-liberal. Trade and financial liberali-
sation, deregulation, deficit reduction and privatisa-
tion of state enterprises were consistently furthered
during his administration (Lustig 1992). But unlike
de la Madrid, Salinas made social policy a key ele-
ment of his governmenG strategy This was made
possible by the improved economic situation and
was considered necessary because of the country's
deep social and polïtical crisis. Social policy became
central to Salinas' aim to regain the population's
sympathy and their support for the ongoing eco-
nomic reforms.
49
According to official figures, social expenditure
grew by 85% in real terms between 1989-93, with
increases of almost 90% in education and 79% in
health care (Cornelius et al. 1994: 22). But the out-
standing feature of Salinas' social policy was the cre-
ation of the National Programme of Solidarity
(PRONASOL) which became the instrument set to
compensate the social costs of the economic crisis
and adjustment measures.
PRONASOL was presented by the government in
1988 as an anti-poverty programme 'designed to
reach the 48% of the Mexican population that lived
below the official poverty line, and especially the
19% (nearly 15 million people in 1989) who were
classified by the government as living in extreme
poverty' (Cornelius et al. 1994).
PRONASOL was not the only instrument for
poverty alleviation. There were targeted subsidies
on some basic goods (e.g. milk and tortillas) -
mostly for urban areas - and general sectoral poli-
cies (e.g. education and health) also benefited some
of the poor. But PRONASOL became an umbrella
organisation in charge of coordinating specific anti-
poverty efforts at federal, state and local levels
(Lustig 1994: 83).
PRONASOL implemented sub-programmes within
three spheres: social welfare which received approx-
imately 70% of the total resources; support for pro-
duction with 15% of the resources; and regional
development with the remaining 15% (Treja et al.
1993: 185). Figure 1 shows the main areas covered
within each sphere. When PRONASOL was created
it included 13 sub-programmes and by 1992 it had
grown to 25 (CCPNS 1994).
What held this array of sub-programmes together
was a set of principles designed to guide the func-
tioning of PRONAS QL. Most important of all:
It was a programme targeted at the poor and
extreme poor. The diversity of sub-programmes
led to the use of various targeting criteria to
identify the beneficiaries, including the mini-
mum wage as a poverty line; indices of social
indicators; an index of marginality; and charac-
teristics related to vulnerability (e.g. age, sex,
pregnancy) (Levy 1991). Geographic targeting
was used to guide resource allocation to state
Social Welfare
Production
Regional Development
Health
Education
Housing
Nutrition
Urbanisation
Mining
Agriculture
Agribusiness
Micro-Enterprise
Fisheries
Regional Programmes
Municipal Funds
Roads
Figure 1: PRONASOUs programme structure
governments so as to make resources corre-
spond to the relative poverty of each state.
Funds for some production sub-programmes
were given only to women or indigenous peo-
ple, while other allocations responded to
demands presented by the communities.
It was a demand-based programme whereby
most government actions were expected to
respond to the expressed priorities of the poor
people. Demands were to be channelled mainly
through community level bodies called Comités
de Solidaridad in the form of explicit project
proposals.
It required the inclusion of community partici-
pation in all its interventions, mainly in the
form of prioritisation and articulation of
demands by the poor, and their 'co-responsibil-
ity' (i.e. cost-sharing) expressed in their contri-
bution of labour for the implementation of
projects. There was a strong discourse in the
programme design linking the participation of
the poor with self-sufficiency and poverty
reduction.
lt decentralised the administration of funds by
channelling them through the state and munic-
ipal governments.
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The design of PRONASOL was the result of influences
from various sources. First, it built on the previous
experience of PIDER and COPLAMAR, particularly on
their aims, project design and emphasis on participa-
tion and co-responsibility (Brachet-Márquez 1996;
Fox 1997a). Second, the emphasis on the need for
community participation within the context of anti-
poverty actions was enhanced by the ideological influ-
ence of the leftist antecedents of Salinas and his team.
Third, there was also the influence from neo-liberal
ideology in the need to design a programme which did
not contradict market-oriented principles, and
focused on issues such as decentralisation of resource
allocation, targeting, and cost-sharing. Fourth, there
was a certain degree of international influence posed
by the trend of compensatoiy programmes being
implemented in adjusting countries, particularly the
Emergency Social Fund in Bolivia (Graham 1994).
This set of influences shaped PRONASOL into a
compensatory programme with specific features.
Namely, it implied a greater role for the state in the
social sphere than that assigned under initial reform
strategies; it was planned as temporary (at least ini-
tially); it was demand-driven; it encouraged partic-
ipation and co-responsibility; it was compatible
with the economic model; and it was meant to
boost the political sustainability of the economic
reforms which remained the government's priority
The term 'social liberalism' was coined by Salinas to
describe how the economic and social components
of his overall strategy fit together and reinforced
each other. The ambition was to prove that eco-
nomic liberalisation could go hand in hand with
improvements in the standard of living of the pop-
ulation. But although the actions and high profile of
PRONASOL were successful in gaining political
support for the governmenls economic policy, its
achievements as an anti-poverty programme have
not been highly praised.3 Although it benefited
many poor people, PRONASOL was not very effec-
tive at targeting the poor, even less the extreme poor,
or at tackling the causes of poverty Official figures
asserted that the number and percentage of extreme
poor decreased from 14.9 million (18.8% of the
population) in 1989 to 13.6 million (16.1%) in
1992. This remained higher than the figure in 1984
when 11 million (15.4%) were in extreme poverty
(cited by Cornelius et al. 1994: 23). However esti-
mates calculated by Székely and Pánuco-Laguette
(1995: 23-25) argue that from 1989-92 extreme
poverty increased by 0.1%. Within the context of a
growing economy, these figures (even the official
ones) are not comforting. Inequality also increased
according to official figures from a Gini coefficient
of 0.469 in 1989 to 0.477 in 1994 (PEF 1997: 16).
Some of the causes for this poor performance
include:
Its targeting of the poor was deficient because of
the inconsistency of its methods and political
influence (by federal and local government offi-
cials) in the allocation of resources.
It failed to design sub-programmes which took
into account the differences in needs between
the moderate and extreme poor. Very few
resources were allocated to direct transfer pro-
grammes, such as cash transfers, feeding pro-
grammes, and primary health care and
education which are essential for combating
extreme poverty. The design of most programmes
made it more likely for those above the extreme
poverty line to benefit. That was the case of
social infrastructure projects (which constituted
the majority of PRONASOLS investments) and
For an official evaluation of PRONASOL see CCPNS
(1994) which is a quantitative account of the
programme's work. For assessments of its poverty
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production projects (e.g. micro-enterprises),
and is also the result of the urban bias of inter-
ventions whereas most of the extreme poor live in
rural areas.
Many sub-programmes had no clear link with
poverty reduction - for example, the construc-
tion of super-highways, bridges, sporting facili-
ties and renovation of an airport.
Its temporary and compensatory nature did not
attack the real causes of poverty, including
issues of material and power inequalities, and it
continued to rely on economic growth as the
main solution to poverty
Its demand-driven nature prevented the poorest
from benefiting since they were the least likely
to be organised and to present project proposals.
The ideal of community participation was not
lived up to in most cases. While it was a strong
element in the design of the programme, in
practice it was seen in many cases (although not
in all) either as a formal requirement or as lim-
ited to cost-sharing. The Comités de
Solidaridad were often not autonomous repre-
sentative entities but subject to clientelistic or
semi-clientelistic relations.
Some of these critiques recall those made about
compensatory programmes in general, while others
are specific to the way PRONASOL was designed
and implemented. However, this programme was
key in establishing a precedent for future policy by
acknowledging the social and political need for
greater state action to combat poverty within a neo-
liberal economic model.
During the last year of the Salinas administration
the spell created by the apparent wonders of 'social
liberalism' was broken by the Indian rebellion in
Chiapas (one of the poorest Mexican states and also
one of the most favoured by PRONASOL resources)
and political violence within the official party The
financial crisis of December 1994 came to obscure
the ideal of economic recovery and sent Mexico
back to the days of austerity
reduction impact see Levy (1991); Trejo et al. (1993);
Lustig (1994); Guevara (1996).
Source: SH (1977: !V.2)
General Actions
(overall population)
(Targeted Actions
(combat of
extreme poverty)
-
Social Security
Health
Education
Housing
Human Capital Development(health, nutrition and education)
Income Opportunities
Physical Capital Development(basic social infrastructure)
Figure 2: Mexican social policy under the Zedillo administration
4 Programa de Educación, Salud
y Alimentación (PROGRESA): The
New Poverty Agenda in Mexico?
(1997-2000)
President Zedillo, another member of the techno-
cratic elite, took office on December 1994 and soon
found himself heading a country back into eco-
nomic and political instability. The crisis was
blamed on the previous administration, and a con-
siderable effort was made by the Zedillo govern-
ment to distance itself from its predecessor.
The Mexican economy had to be bailed out by an
external financial support package which included
agreements with the US government and the IMP
The economic policies implemented were reminis-
cent of the early 1980s, focusing on demand
restraint to achieve stabilisation. Despite the change
in fortunes being experienced, market economics
were not abandoned because of the influence of
international financial actors and the strong belief
of the elite running this administration that the way
forward lay in orthodox economics. These polïcies
gradually began achieving their aims, but the costs
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to the economy and population of this latest down-
turn have been high. In 1995, the economy shrank
6.2% in real terms and activity contracted in all sec-
tors. Real wages continue to deteriorate and
employment levels are still insufficient to provide
work for the approximately 1.2 million new job
seekers per year (González 1998).
Immersed in economic difficulties and political vul-
nerability, the new government focused on eco-
nomic aims and was slow to come up with a
consistent social policy proposal. This was a serious
matter, particularly in a context where the popula-
tion needed to be protected from the costs of the
new crisis and further efforts to combat already
high levels of poverty were essential.
The social policy proposed in the National
Development Plan 1995-2000 (PEF 1995) was an
ambitious proposal highlighting the need to act on
two levels: improving the provision and quality of
general social services, and providing specific atten-
tion to 'the population with greater economic and
social disadvantage'. Anti-poverty policy consti-
tuted this second level. Stress was put on benefiting
individuals and promoting the formation of human
capital and the creation of opportunities (see Figure
2). But these general guidelines took time to mate-
rialise into a coherent plan and specific policy
actions. During the first years of Zedillo's adminis-
tration it was not uncommon to hear complaints
about the vacuum in the social policy sphere, espe-
cially when compared to the high-profile actions of
Salinas's government.
The strand of targeted actions was designed to com-
plement sectoral social policy by implementing
programmes directed to the 20% of the population
(approximately 20 million) living in extreme poverty
according to official figures. Given that the govern-
ment recognises a 40% poverty incidence, this
would mean that anti-poverty actions would not be
benefiting the other 20% living in poverty
However, in government documents the concepts
of poverty and extreme poverty seem to be inter-
changed at times. Thus, sometimes targeted actions
are said to be aimed at combating extreme poverty,
while on other occasions they are defined as a strat-
egy to combat poverty. This is not surprising, since
the government is moving towards targeting only
the extreme poor, but some of its programmes have
not yet narrowed their target and still benefit the
overall poor.4 Government officials interviewed
asserted that many of the programmes also benefit
the moderate poor (i.e. the poor living above the
'extreme poverty line'). This double standard serves
to justify their strategy in the public eye by claiming
that it does not abandon all the poor who are not
extreme poor, while at the same time they continue
to aim for a narrower target group.
Over the course of the administration, the elements
comprising the anti-poverty strand have gradually
been put in place, as shown by Figure 3. One of the
first steps taken was the dismantling of PRONASOL
as an umbrella organisation and the restructuring of
anti-poverty policy along the lines of the three sub-
strands that integrate it.
From interviews with government officials, it became
clear that the disarticulation of PRONASOL was seen
as needed both for political and practical reasons.
Politically Zedillo needed to disassociate himself
An example of this is the tendency towards
eliminating the remaining targeted subsidies on milk,
tortilla and other basic products (Zermeño 1998a;
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from the Salinas government, and PRONASOL had
been Salinas's trademark. Moreover, PRONASOL
itself had been strongly criticised as an ïnstrument of
political manipulation and its legitimacy among var-
ious sectors of society was shattered. In more practi-
cal terms, Zedillo's high-ranked staff seem to have
concluded that PRONASOL had not been an effec-
tive anti-poverty programme and that a new and
more cost-effective approach was needed, especially
under the prevalent financial constraints.
The transfer from the Salinas to the Zedillo admin-
istration represented the eventual substitution of
what could be termed a 'leftist neo-liberal' political
group by 'purer neo-lïberals' within the political
elite. This ideological shift has had consequences
for the design of the present anti-poverty strategy
The core of PRONASOLs leftist ideology behind
poverty reduction has gone. The strongest evidence
for this is the lack of emphasis within this adminis-
tration strategy on community participation as a
key element in implementing programmes.
Although the word 'participation' floats around all
documents, it no longer has substance nor the nec-
essary political backing. One official admitted that
participation was seen by the present government
as: (1) a potential source for political manipulation
which would lead to loss of credibility, as had hap-
pened with PRONASOL; and (2) a time-consuming
effort which is incompatible with the effectiveness
required from anti-poverty programmes. The gov-
ernment might even see community participation
as a potential threat, since it may fuel political
mobilisation and opposition.
In spite of the dismantling of PRONASOL as a
'super-programme', various of its sub-pro-
grammes still remain (although with different
names) and are now the core part of the income
opportunities sub-strand, which accounted for
16% of the anti-poverty budget in 1998. The
physical capital development sub-strand can also
be traced back to PRONASOLs regional develop-
ment sub-programme. Within the human capital
development sub-strand, which now receives
51% of all anti-poverty expenditure, lies the key
trademark and one of the main innovations of this
administration's anti-poverty strategy: the
1998e). However, these subsidies still benefit poor
people who are not extreme poor.
Actions Against
Extreme Poverty
Source: 5H (1978: IV.30)
Human Capital Development
Income Opportunities
Physical Capital Development
H
PROGRESA
Food programmes: school
breakfast, supply of milk,
tortillas and other goods
Health: extension of IMSS-
SOLIDARIDAD
Compensatory education
programmes
Temporary employment
programme
Provision of equipment for
low-income farmers
Support for arid areas
Support of production by the
Instituto Nacional Indigenista
National fund for support of
social enterprises
Development of basic social
infrastructure in marginalised
regions
Potable water and sanitation
in marginalised urban and
rural areas
Figure 3: Main actions of the anti-poverty strategy of the Zedillo administration
Programme for Education, Health and Nutrition
(PRO GRESA).
PROGRESA only began to be officially implemented
in July 1997, after three years of trial and error with
its design. During 1997, PROGRESA reached
nearly 400,000 households in rural areas and it
planned to reach 2 million by the end of 1998,
500,000 of whom would be in urban areas. By the
end of the administration it aims to reach 5 million
families which, according to official calculations,
would be most of the extreme poor.
The selection of PROGRESA beneficiaries follows a
three step process: (1) Localities are selected
Press coverage in La Jornada and El Financiero
1995-97 describe the antecedents of PROGRESA.
Although the poverty line is set according to
income/consumption criteria, PROGRESA claims to
have a multi-dimensional understanding of poverty This
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according to geographic targeting which considers
their relative marginality; (2) Extensive household
surveys are conducted in the chosen localities to
gather data on a number of welfare indicators;6 (3)
The data are fed into a computer that selects the
beneficiaries according to a formula that determines
who are extreme poor, defined as those 'households
that do not have enough resources to satisfy their
basic food needs' (PROGRESA 1997). According to
government officials, this allows a 'scientific' selec-
tion of beneficiaries, transparent use of resources,
and greater cost-effectiveness.
PROGRESAS aim is to improve the 'basic capabilities'
of the extreme poor by integrating actions aimed at
is put in practice through a survey which considers not
only income but other social indicators such as: size of
household, type of housing, level of schooling,
economic activities, access to social services and asset
holdings.
simultaneously raising their education, health and
nutrition levels. Poverty is understood as a 'vicious
circle' of undernourishment, high morbidity and
low education which prevents the poor from devel-
oping their 'productive potential'. Following this
understanding, PROGRESA frames its anti-poverty
objectives as being 'the development of the capabil-
ities and potential of the poor families' and to
'ensure that all Mexicans have access to a minimum
welfare in terms of nutrition, basic health care and
basic education' (author's translation PROGRESA
1997: 38). The core of these actions are cash and
food handouts given to each selected household in
exchange for the beneficiaries' responsibility to
attend health and nutrition check-ups and ensure
their children's school attendance. It is assumed that
these actions will build the human capital and pro-
ductive potential of beneficiaries and thus increase
their opportunities for earning higher incomes.
PROGRESAS strategy can thus be seen as having
two overall streams of action, one of them geared
towards short-term poverty alleviation and the
other towards sustainable poverty reduction in the
long-term.
The poverty alleviation stream comprises public
transfers which are given to the selected beneficia-
ries in order to ensure the achievement of their
basic capabilities in the short-term by allowing
them to gain command of a minimum bundle of
commodities and services (mainly food, health care
and education). These transfers are:
Monthly cash allowances given to the families
of children attending from third to sixth grade
of primary school and any of the three sec-
ondary school levels, to compensate for the
costs of sending children to school. The amount
of this 'scholarship' increases as the education
level advances and is higher for girls in sec-
ondary school, so as to reverse the gender bias
in education. School materials are also given to
each child.
Monthly cash allowances to contribute to the
ïmprovement of the families' food consump-
tion.
Nutrition supplements given to all children
between 4 months and 2 years, to undernourished
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children between 2 and 5 years, and to preg-
nant and lactating women.
These transfers are given on a bimonthly basis to
the mother (or other female member in charge) of
the family as a way of avoiding the gender and age
bias of intra-household distribution of food and
other commodities. There is a maximum level of
cash transfers that a single family is allowed to
receive, so as to avoid the creation of dependency
on public aid and to 'not discourage their self-
improvement efforts' (author's translation PRO-
GRESA 1997: 51). The logic also implies that
transfers may take the beneficiaries up to the
poverty line (at the most) but not above it. Selected
families are entitled to three years of transfers and
after this time they have to reapply Only if they are
still eligible (i.e. still extreme poor) can they con-
tinue to receive the transfers.
The poverty reduction stream of PROGRESA can be
linked to its emphasis on improving beneficiaries'
nutrition, health and education standards. This is
seen as a long-term effort to improve the human
capital of the poor so as to raise their productivity
and their income-generating potential, and thus
allow them to escape poverty through their own
efforts and in a sustainable way Specific actions for
this second stream are concentrated around the
beneficiaries' use of health and education services
and their attendance at talks on preventive health,
nutrition and sanitation.
Clearly, PROGRESAS design shares some of the
principles guiding the NPA. It integrates two NPA
components - building human capital and the pro-
vision of transfers - though it does not address the
NPAs emphasis on labour intensive growth and the
provision of safety nets for temporary shocks (Trejo
and Jones 1998), and it is worrying that the overall
anti-poverty strategy fails to provide these. The sim-
ilarities between PROGRESA and the NPA are the
result of the influence of conventional wisdom,
which seems to have been carried forward in
Mexico by the current under-secretary for expendi-
ture, Santiago Levy Levy is credited for being the
intellect behind the design of PROGRESA and of
much of the restructuring of this administration
social policy Working for the World Bank, he pro-
duced a report in 1991 titled 'Poverty Alleviation in
Mexico' which contains the basis for PROGRESA. It
endorsed the need for human capital development,
better targeting and specific attention to the extreme
poor (Levy 1991).
This points to the fact that PROGRESA is the outcome
of national design, but was also influenced by the ide-
ological ties that its designer had with the World Bank
- which does not mean that it was imposed from the
World Bank. According to a PROGRESA official, some
meetings were held between those who designed
PROGRESA at the ministry of finance and officials
from the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank and even the Chilean government
(since PRO GRESA is very similar to some well-known
Chilean programmes). However, these meetings seem
to have been strictly for advice on planning and not a
source of impositions. Furthermore, PROGRESA is
intended to run only on federal funds and has no
World Bank funding. This exemplifies how interna-
tional ideological trends and national elite ideology
went hand in hand in the design of PROGRESA.
Critiques of Zedillo anti-poverty strategy have
flourished. They centre, among other issues, on its
reduction of the beneficiary group and accuse it of
being asistencialista, a term meaning that its actions
are limited to charity and fail to address the real
causes of poverty or to promote sustainable poverty
reduction.7
Although it is still too early to engage in a compre-
hensive impact assessment of PROGRESA, a pre-
liminary analysis of its strengths and limitations can
be advanced. Three aspects will be examined: its
targeting and coverage, its short-term poverty alle-
viation component, and its long-term poverty
reduction component.
4.1 Targeting and coverage
The use of methodical targeting mechanisms to
identify beneficiaries can be seen as a positive fac-
tor. As PROGRESA officials argue, this should con-
tribute to using resources more effectively and
avoiding their discretionary allocation on partisan
lines, as was the case with previous anti-poverty
programmes.
It is interesting that in an explanatory video of
PROGRESA, both the interviewers and the beneficiaries
intervïewed, refer to the programme's benefits as ayuda,
which means aid. It is clear that beneficiaries do not
perceive PROGRESA as something they have a right to
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The definition of the extreme poor as the target
group can be seen from two perspectives. On one
hand, this is perhaps the first time that many of the
extreme poor will receive direct benefits from the
state, having been neglected before in favour of
more vocal and organised groups. The fact that
actions are predominantly carried out in rural areas
(where most of the poor live) should also be wel-
come, as urban settings had been favoured previ-
ously On the other hand, the narrow definition of
the target group raises some concerns. Firstly, all
the moderate poor - about 20 million people
according to official figures - are excluded from the
benefits of the programme. According to the
under-secretary for expenditure, 'the core problem
is the insufficient availability of resources' (Levy
cited in Zamarripa 1998), but critics claim that the
problem lies with the government's priorities
(Zermeño 1998a; 1998b). Second, left-wing oppo-
nents of the government claim that the official
poverty figures are too low and that the extreme
poverty line should be raised to reflect their view
that 45% of Mexicans live in extreme poverty and
not 20% as the government contends (Arroyo
1998: 9). Nonetheless, these disagreements should
not completely overshadow the programme's posi-
tive contribution if, in fact, it does reach 5 million
families by the year 2000.
4.2 Short-term poverty alleviation
component: transfers
Preliminary assessments have found that
PROGRESAS cash transfers are predominantly used
for buying food (PROGRESA 1998; CDSCD 1998).
Clearly, these transfers do have the potential to
impact positively on the immediate needs of those
extreme poor who are reached. On the other hand,
the possibility of exchanging the cash transfers into
food may be limited by problems of food supply in
the remote rural areas where many of the beneficia-
ries live, the unexpected inflation which may be
brought about by the sudden inflow of money into
these communities, and the cost for transportation
that beneficiaries have to pay in order to receive
their cash - which in some cases takes up to 40% of
their transfer (CDSCD 1998).
receive, but as aid given by the government, which
could be taken away at any moment. Fox (1997b)
provides a good analysis of the relationship between the
World Bank and Mexico.
4.3 Long-term poverty reduction
component: development of human capital
The long-term poverty reduction perspective that
PROGRESA takes is valuable in itself as it gives a
place for policies aiming at sustainable improve-
ments in people's well-being which are not solely
dependent on state transfers. However, five factors
can be identified that may weaken PROGRESAS
poverty reduction impact.
First, building human capital requires that the nec-
essary social services will be available. PROGRESA
itself does not include a social service provision
component. Instead it concentrates on tackling
demand-side obstacles to the poor's access to social
services (i.e. through the transfers) and counts on
existing social services (as provided by state gov-
ernments and the health and education ministries)
to cover the expected increase in demand. But a
recent assessment concluded that there are simply
not enough health clinics and schools in the areas
where the extreme poor live to meet their needs
(CDSCD 1998). Some of the most destitute families
in Mexico live in areas so remote that no services
are accessible to them at all. Thus, many beneficia-
ries are not receiving the health care and education
that the programme is said to guarantee. It is diffi-
cult to foresee how their human capital will be built
in such a way that allows them to be integrated on
equal terms into a very competitive national econ-
omy
Second, it could be argued that the extreme poor will
benefit mostly from poverty alleviation interven-
tions but will find it more difficult to take advantage
of long-term investments in their human capital,
such investments would probably generate better
outcomes if the moderate poor were targeted. This is
not to say that long-term investment should not be
geared towards the extreme poor but to suggest that
it should be expanded to cover the moderate poor.
Third, the success of the long-term aim of the pro-
gramme is based on two factors: building of human
capital and the productive use of that capital by the
poor. But efforts to support and diversify the poor
productive activities are limited, and there are no
convincing policies for generating employment for
low-skilled citizens. The government is counting on
economic growth to create jobs, but Mexico's growth
pattern predominantly generates employment for
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skilled labour, which will certainly not be the case of
the extreme poor even after finishing secondary
school. Furthermore, these jobs are mostly avail-
able in the urban areas, whereas most of
PROGRESAS beneficiaries live in rural settings.
Without productive income-generating activities
and employment opportunities for the rural poor,
PROGRESAs success in terms of sustainable
poverty reduction will be negligible.
Fourth, the history of anti-poverty programmes in
Mexico has taught us that although there is some
continuity, they are always vulnerable to changes in
political administration. All PROGRESA officials
interviewed were confident that the programme
would be continued by the following administra-
tion if it proves to function effectively and effi-
ciently and if it receives the support of the
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the programme has
been criticised by the two main opposition parties,
and some groups within the official party also dis-
agree with some of its principles. In light of this,
the continuation of PROGRESA beyond the year
2000 is not ensured. If the programme were to be
discontinued, the long-term investment of today
could not be interpreted as more than a short-term
gain.
Fifth, PROGRESA suffers from the same shortcom-
ing as the NPA itself. lt fails to recognise the role
that unequal power relations and socio-economic
structures have played in constructing and perpetu-
ating poverty in a country in which economic
inequality goes hand in hand with social and racial
discrimination. By neglecting these factors and
avoiding to consider far-reaching social and eco-
nomic reforms which would challenge such
inequalities, it is difficult to foresee a real solution to
poverty in Mexico.
5 Conclusions
Mexico's anti-poverty policy since the initiation of
economic adjustment has reflected the uninter-
rupted dominance of neo-liberal ideology as the
basis for economic and social policy reform. Within
this context, the priority of economic policy has
gone unquestioned and anti-poverty policy has
been subordinated to it, becoming a compensatory
mechanism for the social costs of the economic
model.
The anti-poverty policies implemented by Mexico
have had comparable results and are subject to sim-
ilar critiques as those recommended by the World
Bank. The introduction of stabilisation and struc-
tural adjustment policies in Mexico contributed to
worsening welfare indicators and increased poverty,
as occurred in many other countries following
adjustment programmes. Critiques of the World
Bank over the social costs of its policies also applied
to the Mexican government in the mid- 1980s.
Moreover, some of the criticisms of PRONASOL
were similar to those made of the World Bank's
endorsement of compensatory programmes,
because of their limited potential for poverty reduc-
tion. The changes in the poverty indices for this
period in Mexico indicate that these criticisms were
correct.
But it would be too simplistic to assert that the
Mexican government replicated the conventional
wisdom because of the World Bank's imposition, as
is usually claimed for adjusting countries. Mexico is
relatively powerful vis-à-vis the World Bank since it
is one of its largest borrowers (holding up to 12% of
its total portfolio) while World Bank loans represent
a relatively small share of Mexico's external loans.8
Whilst there has certainly been direct World Bank
influence, this has been limited mostly to ensuring
acceptable economic policy and has not ventured to
the anti-poverty area as such. The influence on
Mexican anti-poverty policy has come more from
the international ideological shift, than from obedi-
ence to policy guidelines prescribed by particular
institutions. It is more accurate to say that the par-
allels outlined above are the result of the confluence
of ideology between the actors dictating the inter-
national trend and the technocratic political elite
that has ruled Mexico since 1982. Many of the shifts
in economic and anti-poverty policy during the last
two decades can be credited to the influence of this
new national elite and the differences between the
groups that constitute it.
The Mexican case shows how anti-poverty policies
that are designed according to the principles of neo-
liberalism and implemented alongside market-
based economic reforms are unlikely to lead to
sustainable poverty reduction. The current anti-
Fox (199 7h) provides a good analysis of the
relationship between the World Bank and Mexico.
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poverty strategy in Mexico suffers from several
defects which will limit its impact, including the
following:
The government is certain that sustained eco-
nomic growth will result from its neo-liberal
economic policies, and that this growth will
benefit all sectors of the population by generat-
ing income-earning opportunities that will
enable poor people to rise from poverty As a
result of this naïve belief, it has failed to imple-
ment policies directed at creating employment
opportunities for unskilled workers or promot-
ing productive activities in low-income urban
and rural areas.
Based on arguments of resource constraints and
cost-effectiveness, the government has nar-
rowed the target population to the limit. By tar-
geting only those it acknowledges as extreme
poor, at least 20 million poor Mexicans are
excluded from the benefits of its anti-poverty
interventions. The priorities for resource alloca-
tion should be rethought in order to allow the
expansion of the anti-poverty efforts to include
the poor who have been excluded.
Poor people are now seen as passive recipients
of aid, and not as agents capable of expressing
their priorities and participating in the design
and implementation of policies intended to
benefit them. Contrary to what the government
expects, it is likely that this anti-participation
approach will reinforce the poor's dependence
on public assistance, in which case, PROGRESA
cannot aspire to be more than asistencialista -
that is, its actions will resemble charity more
than being a real solution to poverty
While the current strategy aims to improve the
standard of living of the extreme poor, it does so
with a set of policies which do not tackle the
structural causes of poverty The difficult issues
underlying unequal power relations,
entrenched economic inequality and racial dis-
crimination are left untouched. While the lives
of many poor people may improve as a result of
these anti-poverty actions, most of the benefits
are likely to be short-term: beneficiaries will
have their poverty alleviated but not eradicated.
This article has shown that the overall anti-poverty
strategy of the Mexican government is too limited to
generate a sustainable poverty reduction process.
While the international conventional wisdom seems
to be moving towards a more progressive agenda
which builds on the recognition of the limitations of
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